The Uvalde report from the DOJ reveals a significant breakdown in the response to the school shooting, with "unimaginable failure" being cited. Here are the main points to remember.

The Uvalde report from the DOJ reveals a significant breakdown in the response to the school shooting, with “unimaginable failure” being cited. Here are the main points to remember.

A lawyer who is representing families in Uvalde has spoken up following the release of a report by the Department of Justice.

The lawyer representing families from Uvalde has spoken out following the release of a report by the Department of Justice.

A federal report

Examining the actions taken by law enforcement

In May 2022, during the shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, investigations revealed that multiple mistakes made by officers allowed the attack to persist while they were present at the school.

U.S. Department of Justice’s

The COPS Office, also known as the Office of Community Oriented Policing, analyzed a vast amount of information and records and conducted over 260 interviews, including with members of law enforcement and school staff.

Relatives of those who were harmed
The investigation team met with witnesses and survivors of the massacre, making nine visits to Uvalde and spending a total of 54 days in the local community.

At a press briefing following the report’s publication, Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta stated that the reaction from law enforcement was an “unprecedented failure,” and that “neglectful behavior from adults resulted in a failure to safeguard children and their educators.”

After the shooting, some officers were fired. However, the report acknowledged that certain officers’ behavior could have been affected by inadequate policies and training.

Some additional key points from the extensive 600-page report include:

The Uvalde police arrived at the scene within a few minutes, but they delayed entering the classroom.

The investigation revealed that the authorities responded quickly to the attack, with police arriving at the scene within a few minutes of it being reported. Eleven officers entered the school only three minutes after arriving, but five of them headed towards the classroom and then retreated for cover when the initial shots were fired.

After three attempts to approach the classrooms where in a school shooting

Nineteen students and two teachers lost their lives in a tragic school shooting.

According to the report, the attention changed from preventing the shooter to clearing out other areas.

The analysis revealed that there was significant confusion, miscommunication, a lack of urgency, and a lack of effective incident command.

The report deemed this reaction a major mistake, noting that some officers followed standard procedures before withdrawing upon hearing gunshots. The police also prioritized the arrival of extra SWAT members, a tactic that the report advised should not hinder a prompt response. In light of the Columbine school shooting, the report emphasized the importance of immediately neutralizing the shooter as a fundamental principle of active shooter response.

The report stated that the main goal takes precedence over all other factors, including the safety of the officers.

48 minutes after the initial entry into the school by officers, four additional shots were heard. It was assumed that the classroom doors were locked, so no one attempted to enter. According to the report, instead of retreating, these gunshots should have prompted a more urgent response to confront the suspect. However, officers continued to wait for a sniper for another 15 minutes, even though they were unable to see inside the building.

Newly released 911 calls from the Uvalde shooting at 5:00 am.

The ex-chief of police was held responsible for the chaotic reaction.


The report indicated that Mariano Pargas, the current acting chief of the Uvalde Police Department, has been in office since 1993.

Stepped down from his role. “best position to start taking command and control and coordinating with approaching personnel,” but ended up in charge of the scene.

Arredondo was originally designated as the individual in the most favorable position to assume command, control, and coordination with approaching personnel. However, he ultimately took charge of the scene.

Earlier, he stated that he was unaware.

He was responsible for managing the situation.

According to the report, Arredondo got rid of radios which caused problems with communication. Additionally, the leadership at the scene failed to set up command posts, resulting in inaccurate updates for arriving personnel.

The report stated that officers who arrived on the scene were under the impression that the shooter was deceased or that Arredondo was in the room with the suspect due to a lack of urgency and misinformation being spread. The officers repeatedly referred to the shooter as “barricaded” and “contained.”

According to the report, the biggest mistake was that the officers who responded did not immediately realize that it was an active shooter scenario.

According to the report, Paragas did not give any instructions to the personnel, even though they were in the most suitable position to take charge and coordinate with the arriving personnel. The report also mentions that Paragas was informed that there were numerous victims in the room and contacted dispatch to ensure that there were sufficient emergency medical responders on standby. The report does not provide any details about street closures.

Prevented the ambulances from reaching their destination., the report found. 

According to the report, most of the individuals present had not received training together and there were inadequacies in policies and training. The report also stated that certain first responders had not been trained for active shooter situations.

23 notifications and 7 comments

The investigation revealed that Arredondo instructed officers to prioritize obtaining keys and evacuating other classrooms in the building before entering the rooms where the shooter was located. There were a total of 23 notifications and 7 comments.587 other students

According to authorities, the incident occurred at the school on that particular day.

“Regrettably, multiple times, (Arredondo) instructed officers to halt their efforts to enter classrooms as he believed it was necessary to remove other victims from neighboring classrooms,” the report stated.

The report also found fault with other agency heads for not adequately questioning the judgment of Paragas and Arredondo.

The Uvalde school district did not have a policy in place for dealing with an active shooter.

The study discovered that the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District lacked a policy for addressing active shooter situations, but did have a policy outlining duties and roles for incident command.

The policy states that the district police department chief is responsible for managing the scene, securing the administration office as a command post (if available) and designating a backup post if needed, and communicating with other responding officers. As per this policy, Arredondo acted as the incident commander.

The report discovered that Paragas finally assigned an officer to set up a command post around 45 minutes after officers had arrived at the scene, at 12:17 p.m.

According to the report, leaders from different agencies involved in the response displayed a lack of urgency in creating a command and control system. This resulted in difficulties with sharing information, a lack of awareness of the situation, and little to no guidance for personnel in the hallway or on the perimeter.

The shooter discharged multiple rounds at law enforcement.

According to the report, the classroom doors were opened 27 minutes after the second round of gunshots and 75 minutes after officers initially entered the building. Two minutes later, police also entered the classroom. The responding officers were from various units, including the Border Patrol Tactical Unit, the Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit, and deputies from Uvalde and Zavala counties.

The shooter fired 45 rounds

According to the report, an officer from the Border Patrol Tactical Unit was injured while being killed by a member of the unit.

The authorities provided families with inaccurate information regarding the well-being of the victims.

The report discovered that there were various problems in providing information about the victims.

According to the report, children who were evacuated from their classrooms did not receive sufficient guidance on where to go and did not receive proper medical care before being taken to the designated reunification center. A total of 91 children were evacuated to the back of a chapel at a funeral home, and one child with a bleeding injury required medical attention.

I did not receive it.

Law enforcement officers were seen entering and exiting the chapel, while parents stayed outside the funeral home.

The creation of a physical site for reuniting family members was disorganized and postponed, causing confusion for those trying to locate the center. The report also noted that families faced unreasonable difficulties in reaching the hospital where the victims were taken.

According to the report, individuals from the community, school staff, and other emergency personnel without designated roles were able to reach the bodies of the deceased. It was recommended that the “traumatic” crime scene should have been more secure.

The report discovered that the Texas Department of Public Safety obstructed the efforts of a specialized FBI team that is skilled in informing and consoling the family members of those who were injured or killed.

Merrick Garland, the U.S. Attorney General, stated during a press conference on Thursday following the release of the report, that certain families were given false information that their loved ones had survived, when in fact they had not.

Families are expressing that the absence of solutions and assistance has worsened their trauma.

The families of those who were harmed have asked for information from investigative reports, government officials, and law enforcement, as well as autopsy reports, in order to gain a deeper understanding of their loved ones’ last moments. According to the report, these family members do not connect with the idea of “finding closure” and are still seeking answers.

almost two years following the incident of gun violence. 

Many relatives have expressed that they are unable to progress in their lives until they have answers about their children’s fate. Some have inquired about whether their child was alone or with friends at the time. Others are wondering if their child could have survived if law enforcement had intervened sooner. The report states that there is a lack of accountability, apologies, or recognition of the families’ right to this information, as reported by numerous victims and family members. This lack of information surrounding the circumstances of their loved ones’ deaths is unacceptable and has worsened their already traumatic experience.

The findings of the study indicate that the number of individuals in need of emotional support, both victims and survivors, remains undetermined.